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Are research data a ‘common’ resource?  
 
Natasha Mauthner* 
 
Joining the conversation 
I join this conversation on ‘the commons’ as a feminist qualitative researcher in the 
social sciences who has been caused to think critically about the notion of research 
data as a common resource as a result of my own research practices and experiences. 
In 1995, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) introduced its first 
Datasets Policy. This policy required grant-holders to offer their research data for 
deposit within an archive within three months of completion of their project, unless 
there were convincing reasons for not doing so. The following year, a colleague and I 
applied to the ESRC for a three-year ethnographic study of work and family life in the 
oil and gas industry in North East Scotland. The project was to involve fieldwork in 
families, communities, schools, and oil companies including onshore offices and 
offshore oil platforms. We would be interviewing mothers, fathers, children, human 
resource managers, health professionals and community figures. We had to complete 
a section of the form on ‘Data collection and provision for the preparation and 
archiving of datasets’, in which we had to outline any difficulties we envisaged in 
making the data available for secondary research. This is what we wrote: 
We have some concerns over the confidential nature of data we anticipate 
collecting from both the families and the oil companies, particularly given that 
the proposed project would be a very focused study on a very discrete 
geographical area. However, provided the material was anonymised and all 
identifying features removed, and the research participants give their informed 
consent, we would be happy to offer our dataset to the Data Archive or any 
other data centre and make it available for secondary research.  
In our eagerness to comply with ESRC requirements, we agreed, in principle, to 
sharing our research data. Yet even as we wrote this statement, I had nagging 
questions about this policy, its underlying assumptions, and its potential effects on my 
research practices and participants. I knew from my previous research on mothers’ 
experiences of postnatal depression how sensitive these women were to what I was 
doing with their stories. Part of their motivation for taking part in my study was so 
that they, through me, could bring their voices and stories out into the open. They 
wanted other mothers to know about what has largely remained an untold and hidden 
story about motherhood: that one in ten mothers experience postnatal depression after 
the birth of their child. At the same time, they were very clear that they did not want 
their story out there in its ‘raw’ form because their greatest fear was being identified. 
These were women whose public face of happy motherhood concealed inner despair 
and a deep sense of guilt and shame (Mauthner 2002). My challenge was an 
intertwined ontological, epistemological and moral one: to establish a relationship 
with these women that would enable them to speak the unspeakable, to tell me things 	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that, as many said, “I’ve never told anyone before”; to discover and make sense of 
stories that went against the grain of hegemonic understandings of motherhood; to 
create the moral and relational conditions of possibility that would allow these women 
to trust me and tell their stories in the knowledge that I would honour them, and use 
their accounts in such a way that would neither cause them moral harm nor violate our 
relationship; and to secure the women’s trust that, although I would be using their 
stories for my own research and purposes, I would not lose sight of what was also in 
their own best interests.  
This challenge required physical, emotional and intellectual effort and investment on 
my part: skill, time, patience, care, compassion and understanding. I recently had 
cause to re-listen to the interviews I did with these mothers for a book I am currently 
writing on the interpretation of interview narratives (Mauthner and Doucet 
forthcoming). I had not listened to these audiotapes for 20 years and I was struck by 
my way of being in these long interviews. In one sense I seem to be doing very little: I 
ask few questions, rarely interject, and largely let them talk – which they did, at great 
length, for asking them a question that few other people had put to them, “Can you 
tell me what it has been like for you becoming a mother?”, was like opening the flood 
gates. Yet this apparent passivity on my part obscured a great deal of activity because 
my practices were focused on communicating to the women that I was listening to 
them closely and hearing what they were saying with care and concern. I 
accomplished this through eye contact, holding their gaze, facial expressions, sitting 
in silence at times, uttering supporting hmms and uh-uhs, and quietly and softly 
interacting with their babies and toddlers who were often present during the 
interviews. All of this work - for although largely taken for granted, this is the 
invisible and ‘naturalised’ (see Bourdieu 1999) labour that we perform as 
interviewers and the reason why we often come away from interviews feeling drained 
and exhausted - created the kind of accepting and non-judgemental space that these 
women had been searching for in their own lives and relationships. And all of this 
work was ontologically, epistemologically and morally necessary to, and indeed 
constitutive of, the material-semiotic realities that my research was bringing into 
being. This labour helped me to discover, and make sense of, the particular stories of 
motherhood and postnatal depression that I heard. These interviews, practices of 
engagement, and relationships were not merely neutral tools giving me access to 
already-constituted and meaningful stories or nuggets of data. Rather, they were what 
and how I was coming to know. 
It was against this research background that I came to the question of whether 
research data should be regarded, a priori, as a common resource. My instinctive 
response at the time of writing the above-mentioned ESRC grant application was that 
the apparently innocuous notion of researchers sharing their data through national or 
international digital repositories was more complicated than it first seemed. The 
ESRC Datasets Policy implicitly assumed that research data were pre-formed, given 
and bounded entities that researchers simply collected. It implied that data could be 
unproblematically harvested, and reused, out of the contexts and relationships in 
which they were produced. It assumed that stories and their meanings were given. 
Most importantly, it took for granted the labour, practices and relationships through 
which data emerge as meaningful entities. It assumed that, for example, the interview 
labour I outlined above was immaterial and inconsequential, entirely separate and 
separable from data and meaning. In other words, it assumed that how we produce 
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knowledge bears no relevance to the knowledge that we produce. Not only is this 
notion contrary to one of the most significant philosophical contributions of feminist 
thinking regarding the inseparability of the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of knowledge 
production (Doucet and Mauthner 2008), but it did not resonate with my own 
experiences of doing research. From my perspective, my knowledge-making practices 
were intricately bound up with and constitutive of the stories I was hearing and my 
interpretations of them, and I did not see data or meaning as inherently separate or 
separable from the contexts in which they were produced. This meant that the very 
thing that I regarded as constitutive of data and meaning – being-in-relation and all 
that it entailed and made possible; or what Barad (2007: 185) terms “the practices of 
knowing in being” – was precisely what was being taken for granted and rendered 
invisible in the notion that research data should be regarded a priori as a common 
resource.  
The ESRC policy therefore raised challenging philosophical questions for me because 
it assumed and imposed a model of knowledge-making that was at odds with my own 
practices. Furthermore, this philosophical model implied a set of moral and political 
assumptions that I found equally problematic. As is clear from the statement we wrote 
in our ESRC application, normative ethical and legal guidelines for data sharing 
suggest that practices such as seeking participants’ informed consent to share their 
data and data anonymisation provide ethical, moral, and legal safeguards for data 
sharing (Van den Eynden et al. 2011). However, I knew from my research 
experiences that protecting our research participants was not achieved by following 
abstract guidelines and principles: it was a matter of understanding what might cause 
moral harm in the context of the specific human relationships in question. Indeed, 
even the assumption that uninvolved third parties could make ethical and moral 
judgements about what might or might not harm participants seemed to me like a 
violation of the participant, the researcher and the relationship between them. This is 
because participants entrust specific researchers, whom they know, with their stories 
and in the process implicitly confer upon these researchers (and not others) the moral 
right to act on their behalf and in their best interests. It follows that it is the 
researchers involved in a particular project who are best placed to judge whether and 
how sharing their specific data might potentially harm their participants, threaten their 
anonymity, breach confidentiality agreements, or violate relationships of trust with 
participants. Yet the ESRC policy was assuming that others could, as a matter of 
principle, make these moral decisions. This in turn raised a further political question: 
in requiring that researchers share their data, the ESRC policy was asking researchers 
not only to give up the fruits of their labour (the hard-won ‘data’ they had invested 
themselves in), but also to renounce their moral ownership rights over their data. In a 
very profound sense, researchers’ labour was being not only rendered invisible; it was 
being appropriated by others, no longer seen as belonging to the researchers in 
question, and therefore no longer seen to constitute legitimate grounds for intellectual 
property or moral ownership rights over the data that they had produced. 
Declaring that research data are to be viewed, a priori, as a common resource is 
neither an innocent nor a neutral practice in at least two ways. First, it depends on 
making a metaphysical, moral and political commitment to the illusion of research 
data’s givenness. The belief or proposition that data are a common resource is only 
possible if data are treated, as the etymology of the word implies, as ‘given’: if they 
are viewed as free-floating commodities that are separate from the contexts and 
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relationships through which they are produced; if the labour of data producers, and 
the moral ownership rights that arise from it, are ignored; and the rights of those who 
make economic rather than material investments in the production of data are 
privileged. Second, these metaphysical, moral and political commitments are 
performative: they have effects. Severing research data from their entangled webs, 
from the labour and relations of their production, is ontologically, epistemologically, 
morally and politically consequential. These breakages, and what they exclude from 
mattering, make a difference to what we discover about the world and how we 
discover it. 
My discomfort with the ESRC Datasets Policy was a response to a radical shift that 
was taking place in data ownership regimes. The de facto moral ownership rights 
enjoyed by researchers were being eroded. New discourses and policies were 
emerging suggesting: firstly, that research data belonged to ‘the public’ and those 
publicly-funded organisations that finance research and employ researchers; and 
secondly, that research data should be viewed as a shared, common and indeed global 
open access resource. As a researcher, I was keen, and indeed felt I had some 
responsibility, to understand how these shifts might impact on my research 
participants as well as reconfigure the nature of my research. In this article I want to 
explore these issues in further detail, and in particular the implicit philosophical 
framework that underpins, and provides the moral and political justification for, the 
move towards treating data as a so-called common resource. To begin, I want to trace 
the emergence of the idea of viewing data as an open access common resource. I then 
outline the regulatory, policy and legislative mechanisms that have been instituted to 
encourage and ensure that researchers comply with data sharing requirements, and 
that are institutionalising new ownership regimes away from research data being 
treated de facto as private property towards it becoming public property. I also spell 
out the case being made for treating data as a public good, including scientific, moral, 
economic and political arguments. I then move on to suggest that positioning data as a 
common resource is dependent on a Cartesian and representational understanding of 
data, their production, and their use in the making of knowledge. Here, I draw 
extensively on the work of Karen Barad (2007), feminist, physicist and science 
studies scholar. Her critique of classical Cartesian and Newtonian metaphysical 
assumptions helps me reveal the positionality of the assumed universalism of treating 
research data as a given and a priori common resource. Furthermore, her elaboration 
of an alternative performative, posthumanist, ‘onto-epistemo-ethical framework’, 
which she calls ‘agential realism’, provides us with a compelling account of scientific 
practice that allows me to make sense of my own practices as outlined above. Barad’s 
work is therefore of enormous political significance because it renders legitimate 
knowledge-making practices that are otherwise seen as ‘deviant’ within a normative 
representational worldview. A further reason why Barad’s framework is useful is 
because it reveals the inevitable inclusions and exclusions that are enacted through 
our metaphysical, moral and political commitments. This opens up the possibility of 
exploring the ‘constitutive effects’ of our exclusionary practices, and again, 
importantly, confers legitimacy on this endeavour. This is what I turn to in the final 
section of the article. I consider what treating data as a common resource and public 
good, and the exclusion of the labour and relations of data producers that it depends 
on, does ontologically, epistemologically, morally and politically. In particular, I 
suggest that emerging regulatory, policy, legislative and discursive practices 
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reinforce, institutionalise and legitimise power differentials and inequalities precisely 
along the lines that feminist scholars have been contesting for over four decades.  
 
Research data as a common resource 
Emergence of the idea that research data are a common resource 
The notion of treating research data as a common and indeed global resource appears 
to date back to at least the 1950s, when it was institutionally established through the 
formation of World Data Centers (particularly in the geophysical sciences) designed 
to minimise the risk of data loss and maximise data access (Shapley and Hart 1982). 
The 1980s witnessed the more widespread application of this idea within the natural 
sciences. In particular, GenBank was one of the earliest bioinformatics community 
projects on the Internet, promoting open access communications and data sharing 
among bioscientists (Benson et al. 2008). It was established in 1982 by the US 
National Institutes of Health and is a comprehensive public database of nucleotide 
sequences and supporting bibliographic and biological annotation.  Its establishment 
and near-universal use as a public archive have transformed the field of molecular 
biology and made possible the modern synthetic use of DNA sequence data. The scale 
of the GenBank database is a result of a communal decision to archive all DNA 
sequence data, a decision initially introduced by scientific journals (Whitlock et al. 
2010). By the early 1990s there was an international move towards treating research 
data as an open, shared and global resource within many fields of the natural sciences 
(e.g. Office of Science and Technology Policy 1991; OECD 1994; National Research 
Council 1997). For example, in their study of data sharing in the natural sciences, the 
US National Research Council (1997: 10) study noted that “The value of data lies in 
their use. Full and open access to scientific data should be adopted as the international 
norm for the exchange of scientific data derived from publicly funded research”.  
 
Regulating research data ownership: data sharing policies and freedom of 
information legislation 
The idea of treating data as a common resource therefore first emerged within the 
natural sciences and seems to have been initially community-led: there were strong 
and convincing scientific reasons for sharing data; and these were widely recognised 
and supported by practicing scientists who then organised themselves and their 
disciplines to create discipline-specific data repositories. In the context of a discussion 
on ‘the commons’, and the different ways in which this term and concept has been 
used, it is useful to note here that this approach comprised self-governed bottom-up 
formed institutions. This contrasts with more recent initiatives (over the past 15 years 
or so) which have moved away from self to government regulation with data 
ownership, control and access less a matter for researchers or research communities to 
decide, and more a matter of government and science policy. This has been 
accompanied by emphasis placed on large scale, increasingly global, common pool 
resources that have no clear governance structure. These changes have come about in 
part because databases of all kinds, not simply those created for research purposes, are 
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being seen by governments as critical scientific and economic resources.1 The UK 
government has highlighted their potential in creating “a high quality research 
infrastructure” (UKRDS 2009: 1; see also Waller and Sharpe 2006; OSI 2007; ESRC 
2008). The international significance of these databases has also been emphasised by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a key international 
science policy organisation, which sees them as “an essential part of the infrastructure 
of the global science system” (OECD 2007: 3). Indeed, research data are being 
viewed as a global commodity, with moves afoot to remove barriers to cross-national 
data exchange (Noble et al. 2011). The availability, development and application of 
advanced computing and information technology over recent years has resulted in 
enormous growth in the volumes of data being generated, and has facilitated and 
enhanced the possibilities of data preservation and sharing. The idea that research data 
can be treated as a shared or common resource has therefore been seen as relevant to 
all forms of data, all disciplines and all researchers across the natural sciences, social 
sciences, and arts and humanities. It has been promoted as a universal norm and 
constructed as a universal good  (see Arzberger et al. 2004), and has been widely 
institutionalised across funding and other research-related organisations within and 
beyond the UK through the development and implementation of data sharing policies 
(Ruusalepp 2008).  
 
The ESRC’s (2010a: 4) Research Data Policy, for example, requires grant holders to 
make their data available for reuse and can “withhold the final payment of an award if 
data have not been offered for archiving to the required standard within three months 
of the end of the award”. Universities are also beginning to develop data management 
plans and strategies requiring their researchers to address, at the outset of their 
projects, the question of data management and sharing. Data sharing is moreover 
increasingly being seen and defined as ‘good research practice’. It is being 
incorporated into ethics and research governance frameworks and guidelines issued 
by universities (e.g. Universities of Edinburgh2 and Oxford3), funding agencies (see 
SHERPA 2009; Digital Curation Centre 2010), professional associations (e.g. 
Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association), data 
repositories (e.g. UK Data Archive (UKDA)), non departmental public bodies (e.g. 
Joint Infrastructures Systems Committee), national and international science policy 
organisations (e.g. OECD), and many other national and international agencies.  
The introduction of freedom of information legislation in the UK - the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 and Environmental Information Regulations 2004, both of 
which came into force in 2005 – are a further means of enforcing data release into the 
public domain, and engendering a shift away from de facto private ownership towards 
public ownership. This legislation means that researchers can now be legally forced to 
release their data. Both Acts provide the public with a right to access information held 
by a UK public authority, which includes most universities, colleges or publicly-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The data sharing imperative is seen as relevant to all types of data, including those created for 
purposes other than research such as administrative data (Jones and Elias 2006) or patient data (Brown 
et al. 2010). In this paper, however, I focus on research data. 
2 http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/information-services/services/research-support/data-
library/research-data-mgmt/data-sharing (Accessed 25 September 2011) 
3 http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/rdm/dmp/checklist/ (Accessed 25 September 2011) 
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funded research institutions. The information requested can include research data and 
must be provided unless an exemption or exception allows an institution not to 
disclose it. Both Acts are designed to ensure accountability and good governance in 
public authorities (Rusbridge and Charlesworth 2010). To date there have been few 
legal requests for researchers to share their data. However, two cases are worth 
highlighting here. In April 2010, Mike Baillie, a dendrochronologist from Queen’s 
University Belfast, was forced to release tree-ring data under the Freedom of 
Information Act. The Information Commissioner’s Office ruled that Queen’s 
University Belfast must release the data to the public because Baillie did all the work 
while employed at a public university. Baillie unsuccessfully contested this directive 
by claiming that the tree-ring data he had collected over a 40-year period were his 
own personal intellectual property (Baillie 2010). In September 2011, the tobacco 
company Philip Morris International submitted a series of Freedom of Information 
requests to the University of Stirling to gain access to research data collected by a 
team of researchers over ten years exploring attitudes towards smoking amongst 6000 
teenagers and young adults. Scotland’s Information Commissioner has dismissed the 
University’s case for failing to release the information and has asked the university to 
respond to the demands made by Philip Morris (Christie 2011). 
It is important to emphasise that the regulatory, policy and legislative changes of 
recent years represent a significant moral and political shift in relation to the 
ownership of research data. Governments have always played a role in mandating 
data gathering and exchange for scientific and political purposes, within the context of 
specific projects (e.g. Dean et al. 2008). Furthermore, universities, as employers of 
researchers, have long had legal ownership of research data. However, in practice, 
researchers have been recognised to have moral ownership over their research data, 
and governments and universities have rarely exercised their ownership rights. 
Researchers have, until recently, had more or less full control over their research data: 
they have decided whether and how their data are stored, shared or reused.  
This has led to a range of practices. The natural sciences have long enjoyed a strong 
culture, ethic and tradition of data sharing (RIN 2009). Currently, many science 
researchers, such as those from the historical and comparative sciences (including 
geology, paleontology, museology, taxonomy, archaeology, anthropology, history and 
the archival sciences), make routine use of data collected by others. Likewise, in the 
social sciences, and arts and humanities, establishment and use of archives, 
preservation of data in the form of personal papers, government records and historical 
and cultural artefacts, and secondary use of quantitative datasets are all well-
established practices (Valge and Kibal 2007). At the same time, there has been a 
tendency within the qualitative social sciences to destroy research data (particularly 
personal data) once they have been analysed and written up (Cheshire 2009). This 
was once seen as good practice. Indeed, this is still reflected in data protection 
policies adopted by funding agencies and universities, policies that are now in tension 
with data sharing imperatives (Carusi and Jarotka 2009). Whereas research data are 
now being seen as a priori public and publicly-owned resources, up until recently 
they were seen as a priori personal or private in nature in two ways: first, they were 
morally, if not legally, seen to belong to the researchers who generated them; second, 
in the case of research involving people, the data were seen to belong to the human 
participants or communities from whence they came. At least one aspect of recent 
‘open data’ initiatives, as they pertain to publicly-funded research data, is therefore an 
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institutional shift in data control and ownership away from private and collective (e.g. 
discipline-based) ownership towards government or public ownership.  
 
The case for viewing research data as a common resource 
Underlying recent regulatory, policy and legal shifts is the principle of ‘open access’, 
and the notion that information, scientific results, and publicly funded research data 
are “a public good, produced in the public interest” (Arzberger et al. 2004: 136; see 
also Willinsky 2006). This principle lies at the heart of the OECD’s (2007) Principles 
and Guidelines for Access to Research Data from Public Funding, a key policy 
document drawn on by funding and other agencies when developing data sharing 
policies (e.g. ESRC 2010a; Medical Research Council 2011). The open access 
principle specifies that “publicly funded research data should be openly available to 
the maximum extent possible” (Arzberger et al. 2004: 136). Arzberger et al. argue 
that the principle of openness to research data should apply “to all science 
communities” (Arzberger et al. 2004: 144; original emphasis) and they urge that this 
imperative is backed with “formal policy frameworks and regulations” (Arzberger et 
al. 2004: 146). Data sharing is therefore being increasingly encouraged, prescribed, 
regulated and enforced in an effort to bring about large-scale behavioural, 
organisational and cultural change: a new research culture in which research data will 
no longer be, and be viewed as, a personal belonging but will morally and legally 
become a public, shared, common and global resource. 
An important question is, on what grounds is this shift being justified? The key 
argument put forward is that it will facilitate ‘better’ research. Turning data into a 
common resource is seen to deliver scientific, moral, economic, political, 
professional, social and security benefits (see Arzberger et al. 2004; OECD 2007; 
UKRDS 2009; CARL 2009; SSHRC 2009). For example, data depositories are seen to 
provide an important resource for training in research. Data reuse is understood to 
reduce the burden on participants and communities caused by multiple data collection 
efforts. Data storage is considered to reduce the information security risks associated 
with maintaining duplicated datasets in more than one location. Moreover, digital 
technologies are seen to have the potential to democratise knowledge and empower 
researchers and research communities; and openness, including data sharing, are seen 
as necessary to unleash this transformative potential. 
It is the scientific, moral, and economic rationales, however, that dominate the case 
being made for data sharing. First, data sharing is seen as ‘good science’, and as 
promoting transparency, innovation and progress (Arzberger et al. 2004). It is 
understood to increase transparency by opening up our data and research processes 
for public scrutiny (Bruna 2010). It is said to allow researchers to verify each others’ 
interpretations by returning to the ‘raw’ data. It enables researchers to investigate data 
in new ways: by asking new questions; by using new techniques or theoretical 
perspectives; by exploring data that were never analysed by the primary researchers; 
or by combining different datasets. The ability to retrieve and compare data from 
multiple sources can lead to the testing of new or alternative methods, and to 
“powerful new insights” (UKRDS 2009: 1). Combining datasets from different 
departments, agencies and sources is seen to enable the creation of new datasets 
which can facilitate high-quality, policy-relevant research by providing a fuller 
picture rather than analysing separate pieces of a jigsaw (ESRC 2008). 
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Second, data sharing is seen to constitute ‘good research practice’. The moral case for 
data sharing draws on the idea that, as public sector workers undertaking publicly-
funded research, researchers are seen to be accountable to the public. Making their 
research data more widely available is understood to be in the public’s interest, and 
part of their moral responsibility and duty (Bishop 2009). The UKDA (2011), for 
example, suggests that researchers have a moral “duty to wider society to make 
available resources produced by researchers with public funds (data sharing required 
by research funders)”. And the Medical Research Council (2011) policy on data 
sharing explains that “publicly-funded research data are a public good, produced in 
the public interest, and ... they should be openly available to the maximum extent 
possible”. Research data are therefore being defined as public resources, public 
property, and public outputs of research: “research data will increasingly be the 
starting point for new research as well as a key output” (UKRDS 2009: 1; see also 
CARL 2009: 4). 
Third, a significant driver for the current move towards data sharing is economic in 
that it allows the state to realise a return on its financial investments. Reusing data is 
seen as a cost-effective and cost-efficient use of public funds because it provides a 
better return on public investment in research. As Arzberger et al. (2004: 135) make 
clear, the goal of open access is “to ensure that both researchers and the public receive 
optimum returns on the public investments in research”. They continue:  
In recent years, the debate on e-science has tended to focus on the “open 
access” to the digital output of scientific research, namely, the results of 
research published by researchers as the articles in the scientific journals... 
This focus on publications often overshadows the issues of access to the input 
of research - the research data, the raw material at the heart of the scientific 
process and the object of significant annual public investments. (Arzberger et 
al. 2004: 135) 
Turning research data into a public resource is therefore seen as a scientifically 
enlightened, morally worthy, politically progressive, and economically beneficial 
activity. As Arzberger et al. (2004: 136) write, “Expanding the adoption of this 
principle to national and international stages will enable researchers, empower 
citizens and convey tremendous scientific, economic, and social benefits”.  
 
Taking seriously the practices that provide the illusion of research data’s 
givenness 
The case for treating research data as a common resource rests centrally on a 
particular philosophical understanding of research data that can be gleaned from two 
key documents: Arzberger et al.’s (2004) paper on ‘Promoting access to public 
research data for scientific, economic, and social development’ and the resulting 
OECD (2007) report on Principles and Guidelines for Access to Research Data from 
Public Funding.  Arzberger et al. (2004: 135) define data as “the raw material at the 
heart of the scientific process”. The OECD (2007: 14) report characterises data as: 
factual records (numerical scores, textual records, images and sounds) used as 
primary sources for scientific research, and that are commonly accepted in the 
scientific community as necessary to validate research findings. A research 
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data set constitutes a systematic, partial representation of the subject being 
investigated.  
These definitions treat data as facts: decontextualised bounded objects that carry 
inherent meanings and are representative of reality. In the words of Knorr Cetina 
(2001: 191), data are understood as ‘closed boxes’ that one views from the outside “as 
one would look at tools or goods that are ready to hand or to be traded further”. From 
this perspective, data are perceived as separate, rather than inseparable, from the 
people, contexts and practices that generate them. While data may be enhanced 
through the provision of contextual information and metadata, fundamentally, context 
is understood as conferring additive rather than constitutive meaning. That is, the 
ontological relationship between object and subject, or data and context, is understood 
in terms of separation rather than relationality. The ontological unit is taken to be 
“independent objects with independently determinate boundaries and properties” 
(Barad 2007: 33) rather than ontologically inseparable and entangled relations.  
One way of understanding how research data are being normatively conceptualised 
within the notion of data as a common resource is in terms of it underlying 
representational framework. Representationalism, explains Barad (2007: 137), takes 
the notion of separation as foundational: “It separates the world into the ontologically 
disjunct domains of words and things, leaving itself with the dilemma of their linkage 
such that knowledge is possible”. Drawing on Rouse (1996), Barad argues that 
representationalism is a Cartesian by-product in its asymmetrical faith in 
representations over the material world, and its neglect of the sociomaterial practices 
through which representations are constituted:  
representationalism is a practice of bracketing out the significance of 
practices; that is, representationalism marks a failure to take account of the 
practices through which representations are produced. Images or 
representations are not snapshots or depictions of what awaits us but rather 
condensations or traces of multiple practices of engagement. (2007: 53) 
I want to consider Barad’s work in greater detail here because it helps us see how the 
case being made for treating data as a common resource is rooted within a particular 
(despite its assumed universalism) Cartesian and representational worldview that is 
based on an ontology of separateness. Barad’s work enables us to do this because she 
has developed a different metaphysical perspective: a performative, post-humanist 
philosophical framework that is premised on a relational ontology. Within her 
‘agential realist’ framework, reality is redefined as sociomaterial phenomena that are 
constituted through, and ontologically inseparable from, the practices of 
representation. These practices are understood in a performative way, as labourers: 
they perform ontological and epistemological (and moral) work. They are material-
discursive labour processes and practices that “help constitute and are an integral part 
of the phenomena being investigated” (Barad 2007: 232). Furthermore, these 
practices do not simply detect differences – between self and other, agency and 
structure, knower and known - that are already in place. Rather they contribute to the 
production and reconfiguring of difference: they constitute self and other, agency and 
structure, knower and known as separate and bounded entities. Significantly, it is the 
ontologically inseparable material-discursive nature of these practices, and how they 
are understood to constitute realities that are at once ontic and semantic, that allows 
agential realism to “take the empirical world seriously once again, but this time with 
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the understanding that the objective referent is phenomena, not the seeming 
‘immediate given-ness’ of the objective world” (Barad 2007: 152). 
Barad places practices of representation, and their productive effects, at the heart of 
her framework. Representationalism relies on a correspondence relation between 
words (discourse/meaning) and things (matter), and assumes that we have access to 
discursive representations in a way that we do not to material beings. Agential realism 
shifts the focus away from the nature of representations to the material nature of 
discursive practices and how they are causally related to material phenomena. “I am 
interested”, she writes, “in a nonrepresentationalist realist account of scientific 
practices that takes the material nature of practices seriously” (2007: 56). A central 
aspect of her project is concerned with understanding matter’s dynamism: the active 
role played by the material world and the body’s materiality in constituting 
phenomena, in contrast to approaches that ignore matter, render it passive, or reduce it 
to social or discursive processes. Matter, she argues, is “a dynamic and shifting 
entanglement of relations, rather than … a property of things” (2007: 35).  
An agential realist framework understands the ontology of the world as being 
comprised not of things but of ‘phenomena’, specific material configurations of the 
world that denote the ontological inseparability and entanglement “of agentially intra-
acting components” (Barad 2007: 33). Barad writes: “Parts of the world are always 
intra-acting with other parts of the world, and it is through specific intra-actions that a 
differential sense of being – with boundaries, properties, cause, and effect – is enacted 
in the ongoing ebb and flow of agency” (2007: 338). Barad’s neologism, ‘intra-
action’, is key to understanding her agential realist framework. Whereas the term 
inter-action assumes the existence of separate individual agencies prior to their 
interaction, the notion of intra-action implies that agencies become determinate, 
separate and distinct only as a result of their intra-actions.  
Epistemologically, agential realism understands knowing as emerging from our 
“direct material engagement with the world” (Barad 2007: 49). We come to know the 
world by intra-acting with, and constituting, it: “We don’t obtain knowledge by 
standing outside the world; we know because we are of the world.” (2007: 185). 
Coming to know the world, through experimentation and theorising, comprises 
“dynamic practices that play a constitutive role in the production of objects and 
subjects and matter and meaning. … theorising and experimenting are not about 
intervening (from outside) but about intra-acting from within, and as part of, the 
phenomena produced” (2007: 56). This is what Barad calls the “practices of knowing 
in being” 2007: 185). Ontology and epistemology, she explains, are inseparable: 
“Practices of knowing and being are not isolable; they are mutually implicated” 
(2007: 185) because “scientific practices are specific forms of engagement that make 
specific phenomena manifest” (2007: 336). The separation of ontology and 
epistemology is a reverberation of representational metaphysics and its underlying 
binaries.   
Each specific material intra-action matters, then, for it brings into being specific 
phenomena and realities. Entangled practices are productive and performative: they 
enact what Barad (2007: 334) terms ‘agential cuts’ effecting and materialising a 
separation between ‘subject’ and ‘object’. That is, there is no inherent Cartesian 
distinction between subject and object. Rather, “the agential cut enacts a resolution 
within the phenomena of the inherent ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy” 
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(2007: 334). Agential realism does not take for granted the boundaries between and 
around subjects and objects, words and things, matter and meaning, nature and 
culture. Rather, it “investigates the material-discursive boundary-making practices 
that produce ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ and other differences out of, and in terms of, a 
changing relationality” (2007: 93). It allows us to be “attentive to the iterative 
production of boundaries, the material-discursive nature of boundary-drawing 
practices, the constitutive exclusions that are enacted, and questions of accountability 
and responsibility for the reconfigurings of which we are part” (2007: 93).  
The deeply entangled material-discursive “practices of knowing and becoming” 
(Barad 2007: 56) play a constitutive role in the production of phenomena, enacting 
exclusions that “matter both to bodies that come to matter and those excluded from 
mattering” 2007: 57).  Epistemological, ontological, and ethical issues are deeply 
entangled and inseparable. This applies both to the practices that are being studied 
and the knowledge-making practices that we engage in. The kind of framework we 
need, suggests Barad, is an ‘ethico-onto-epistem-ology’, an “appreciation of the 
intertwining of ethics, knowing, and being… because the becoming of the world is a 
deeply ethical matter” (2007: 185) and because we must take responsibility “for the 
role that we play in the world’s differential becoming” (2007: 396). 
From an agential realist perspective, ‘data’ are constituted in the intra-action 
(relationship) of the ‘object’ (e.g. empirical realities) and the ‘agencies of 
observation’ (e.g. specific researchers, methods, technologies, practices). The 
objective referent for the data is the phenomenon, which is inseparable from the social 
and material, discursive and technological, human and nonhuman practices that 
constitute the data. The meaning of data emerges from and through measurement 
practices in which the object of investigation and the agencies of observation intra-
act, mutually constitute one another, and are ontologically inseparable. Data 
production involves such measurement practices: material-discursive practices 
through which ontic and semantic realities, meaningful material phenomena, are 
constituted in the form of data (measurements). Data producers, and their methods 
and practices, help produce, and are part of, the data and phenomena they constitute. 
From an agential realist perspective, these phenomena are neither preexisting, but nor 
are they socially constructed or discursively constituted. Rather, they are brought into 
being, come to be known, and constituted as bounded ‘entities’ through the specific 
apparatuses (sociomaterial, human-technological methods and practices) we deploy.  
Representational understandings of data and their production conceptualise the cut 
between data and context in Cartesian terms: data, which are seen to be what matters, 
are understood as free-floating measurements with inherent meanings; context, which 
is seen as secondary to data, comprises the measurement practices, labour processes, 
conditions and relations of production that give rise to the data. From an agential 
realist perspective, knowledge making practices (such as data collection) are 
boundary-drawing devices that produce the bounded entities we denote as ‘data’ and 
‘context’. Data do not represent fixed external (natural or cultural) realities. Rather, 
they are the product of agential cuts, and the constitutive inclusions and exclusions 
that these enact. Specifically, data generation practices enact an agential cut (enacted 
by researchers and the larger sociomaterial relations) between data and context: they 
are inherently inseparable, mutually constitutive, and only meaningful in terms of 
their (ontologically primary) relationality. Meaning is not inherent to the data or to 
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context as separate entities. Rather, it inheres in the intra-active relations between 
them: data and context emerge as separate and determinate entities through our 
specific methods and practices (including, for example, how boundaries are drawn 
around ‘data’ and ‘context’ in the process of data generation).  
 
The constitutive effects of treating research data as a common resource 
I have taken the time to spell out some of the details of Barad’s metaphysical 
framework by way of highlighting how a representational or Cartesian worldview is 
just one way of understanding data, its generation, and its use in the making of 
knowledge. The adoption and institutionalisation of a representational system is 
therefore a matter of ‘choice’, or rather, a position for which responsibility must be 
taken. Barad (2007: 203) explains that we are responsible, not only for the knowledge 
that we seek, but in part for what exists “not because it is an arbitrary construction of 
our choosing, but because it is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a 
role in shaping”: 
Making knowledge is not simply about making facts but about making worlds, 
or rather, it is about making specific worldly configurations – not in the sense 
of making them up ex nihilo, or out of language, beliefs, or ideas, but in the 
sense of materially engaging as part of the world in giving it specific material 
form. (2007: 91) 
We do not have sole responsibility for the realities/knowledge we produce: it is not a 
case of willfully choosing a metaphysical framework. Nor are we fully exonerated 
from responsibility, as this framework is not deterministically imposed upon us. 
Rather, our responsibility comes from the agential part that we play in “the material 
becoming of the universe” (Barad 2007: 178). This means that we must take some 
responsibility for the realities and knowledge we bring into being. At the same time, 
we must recognise that these realities and knowledge (and their underlying 
metaphysical commitments) are intra-actively entangled with larger sociomaterial 
arrangements that we are not fully responsible for. But, we are also partly responsible 
for these because the specific practices, realities and knowledge that we constitute are 
themselves playing an intra-active part in (re)configuring these larger sociomaterial 
arrangements.  
Barad (2007: 93) further argues that we are also responsible for what we exclude from 
mattering, what she terms ‘constitutive exclusions’: “different intra-actions produce 
different phenomena… one can’t simply bracket (or ignore) certain issues without 
taking responsibility and being accountable for the constitutive effects of these 
exclusions” (2007: 58). She further explains: 
There are risks in putting forward an ontology: making metaphysical 
assumptions explicit exposes the exclusions on which any given conception of 
reality is based. But the political potential of deconstructive analysis lies not in 
simply recognising the inevitability of exclusions but in insisting on 
accountability for the particular exclusions that are enacted and in taking up 
the responsibility to perpetually contest and rework the boundaries. (2007: 
205) 
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This performative perspective is useful because it opens up the possibility of 
investigating what realities are brought into being by practices that position data as a 
specific type of ‘common’ resource, namely one that is publicly (government) owned 
(rather than other notions of ‘the commons’). We can ask: what does the illusion of 
research data’s givenness (a commitment to representationalism), and the exclusion of 
the labour of data producers, make possible ontologically, morally, politically and 
legally? In answer to this question, I want to argue that despite suggestions that 
sharing research data is an inherently politically progressive move enabling the 
democratisation of science, the currently dominant vision of data as a common 
resource reinforces, institutionalises and legitimises power differentials and 
inequalities, particularly between data producers on the one hand, and data 
funders/users/consumers on the other (though I recognise the lines between these are 
blurred). In this sense, positioning data as a common – publicly owned - resource 
exacerbates precisely the power imbalances that feminist scholars have been 
highlighting for several decades between researchers and their participants, between 
and amongst researchers, and between hegemonic and ‘other’ or ‘subaltern’ (Spivak 
1988) knowledges and realities.  
 
Power relations between researchers and participants 
For a qualitative researcher like myself, the notion that data are a common resource 
makes a difference to my research practices and what I tell my research participants. 
In order to share the data that I generate, I must seek my participants’ informed 
consent to do so. In a context where digital data loss, and illegal data access and use, 
are routinely featured in the media I have an ethical responsibility to discuss the risks 
and benefits of data sharing. I must also explain that while every effort is made to 
ensure the security and ethical reuse of digitally-stored data, placing their interview in 
a digital archive would lessen my and their control over what happens to the data and 
how it might be used. This is because I am no longer ‘simply’ asking my participant 
to trust me with their story. There are now as-yet-unknown third parties (however 
‘bona fide’), with as-yet-unknown intentions and purposes (however laudable and 
legitimate), to factor into the equation. I would have to explain that researchers 
reusing their interview would be required by the data archive to sign an End Use 
Licence which “has contractual force in law, in which they agree to certain 
conditions, such as not to disseminate any identifying or confidential information on 
individuals, households or organisations; and not to use the data to attempt to obtain 
information relating specifically to an identifiable individual” (UKDA 2011). 
Nevertheless, I would also feel an obligation to explain that this in itself would not 
protect them against the potentially morally harmful effects of seeing their story 
interpreted through different lenses or used for different purposes.  
From this perspective, the recommended (and increasingly mandatory, see ESRC 
2010b) practice of seeking our participants’ informed consent to share their stories for 
future uses they have not been informed about looks increasingly unethical. The 
ethical and moral issue is not only whether our participants will read, or feel morally 
harmed by, what is written about them. Rather, as researchers we have a moral 
responsibility to explain these potential risks because failure to do so risks breaching 
the relationships of trust with participants, and exploiting and wronging them. 
Involving participants in decision-making about data sharing (as recommended by the 
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UKDA) may be a useful approach but only in a context that takes into account power 
differentials between researchers and participants (that feminist and post-colonial 
scholars have been concerned and writing about for over four decades, see Doucet 
and Mauthner 2008). This is because, generally speaking, participants will believe 
what we tell them and will entrust us with their stories because they trust us to do the 
right thing. This places participants in a vulnerable position. It heightens our own 
responsibility to think carefully about what we are asking of, and doing to, our 
participants by seeking their informed consent to data sharing: what the repercussions 
might be not only for our particular participants, but for others like them whose trust 
and participation we rely on for the very conduct of our research.  
Furthermore, spelling out the potential risks of data sharing reconfigures the moral 
and ontological conditions in which I am doing research, conducting fieldwork, and 
building relationships with participants. In my interviews, I am able to make an 
unspoken moral commitment to my participants that I will, to the best of my ability, 
take care of the story they have entrusted me with. Within a data sharing context, 
however, it would be unethical for me to make this moral assurance because I have no 
knowledge of (and most likely little control over) how their story might be used at 
some future date. This is important because it means that seeking our participants’ 
informed consent to share their stories, beyond the research study they are involved 
in, constitutes a different moral context for their storytelling than seeking their 
informed consent to take part in my study and share their story with me and my 
research team. Seeking informed consent is not simply an additional neutral ethical 
procedure that researchers must ensure they carry out and that leaves everything else 
unchanged. Seeking informed consent has moral and ontological effects: it constitutes 
different moral and ontological conditions of possibility for our participants’ 
storytelling. It gives rise to different stories to those that might otherwise have been 
told. For example, knowledge that their account might be lodged within a digital 
archive (consciously or unconsciously) may foster a ‘public’ rather than a ‘private’ 
narrative. Similarly, (and as I have subsequently discovered in a current project4) this 
might impact on my own interviewing style: on my willingness to share and expose 
personal experiences as part of building relationships of trust with my participants, 
knowing these may no longer be shared only with my participant and members of my 
research team. These changes matter ontologically because they might make it more 
difficult to create the kinds of relationships that I see as critical to, indeed constitutive 
of, the narratives I am interested in: the quiet and vulnerable stories that are difficult 
to tell, and hear, in particular social, cultural and historical settings. Indeed, these 
practices will render harder-to-reach the kinds of narratives that many feminist 
scholars have been interested in: the muted, marginalised, and largely untold stories 
that challenge or trouble normative worldviews. 
Conducting an interview on the assumption that it will, by default, be made more 
widely available weakens our participants’ trust in us, as it should do. This is because 
we no longer have the ability or right to act on behalf, and in the interests, of our 
participants. It will no longer be necessarily up to us to decide whether data reuse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This project is developing a performative approach to digital data sharing. I am using research ‘data’ 
and materials from Jennifer Platt’s (1976) pioneering sociological study of the social research process 
as a case study, as well as conducting interviews with her. 
 
Mauthner	   	   Are	  research	  data	  a	  ‘common’	  resource?	  
___________________________________________________________________________	  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  
16	  	  
might be morally harmful to them or might violate the relationship of trust within 
which they told their story. Furthermore, it would be naïve and unethical to suggest 
otherwise to our participants: to avoid spelling out or downplay the moral risks and 
complexities involved in consenting to wider use of their stories. This would be 
exploiting the power that we have as researchers and the trust that participants place 
in us.  
 
Power relations between and amongst researchers 
The uncritical assumption that data constitute a public, common, or global given 
resource obscures the politics of knowledge production within research teams, and 
power relations amongst and between researchers (see Mauthner and Edwards 2007, 
2010; Mauthner and Doucet 2008). In practice, most data are produced by junior 
researchers, PhD students and/or technicians who, because of their structural positions 
and/or career stage, may lack the time and resources that senior researchers have to 
make full and timely use of the data they generate. While their data collection efforts 
are usually, though not necessarily, recognised and rewarded within the team through, 
for example, joint publications, recognition of their labour is less likely within the 
context of open data sharing as currently constituted. Power and status differentials 
between team members risk leaving junior researchers open to exploitation as 
principal investigators have responsibility for making decisions about data sharing. 
Even where senior colleagues consult junior team members, by dint of their power 
and status they may privilege their own objectives. Within the context of international 
projects, there is a risk that data sharing becomes a form of scientific neo-colonialism. 
While turning data into open or common resource has the potential to provide 
postcolonial contexts with easy and cheap access to data generated elsewhere, they 
may lack the necessary scientific, technical, digital or cultural capital and resources to 
make full and speedy use of the data (see Luo and Olson 2008). In practice, it may be 
primarily well-resourced researchers and nations who stand to gain from the 
globalisation of research data, by reaping scientific and economic benefits and 
rewards from data generated by less well-resourced researchers and nations. From this 
perspective, the global data sharing project risks reproducing exploitative relations 
between nations, and between data users and data producers. 
 
The power to define reality 
The final issue I want to problematise here is the assumed universalism of the notion 
that data be regarded, a priori, as a common or public resource. This assumed 
universalism is built on intertwined metaphysical and moral foundations. It depends 
on understanding data as given facts that are independent of those who do the work of 
constituting them. This assumed universalism is also only possible if ownership is 
seen to derive from economic rather than material investments: if the rights of those 
who fund data production are privileged over the rights of those who produce data 
through their material-semiotic labour. Given that data producers are already 
bracketed out within a representational metaphysical framework, their moral and 
political marginalisation ‘naturally’ follows, as does the ‘public interest’ argument: 
the assumption that because data production is funded from the public purse, the 
public necessarily have a right to access and benefit from these data. 
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This assumed universalism is also what provides the justificatory grounds for the 
regulation of research and for a range of practices that, from the point of view of data 
producers, can be understood as ‘boundary-violations’ (Nussbaum 1995) and acts of 
‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 1999). This assumed universalism is precisely what 
makes it possible and seemingly legitimate for funding organisations to require data 
sharing (through their policies) and impose a default representational epistemic 
framework on all researchers, thereby marginalising alternative worldviews. This is 
reminiscent of what post-colonial feminist scholar Spivak (1988) calls ‘epistemic 
violence’: the destruction of non-western ways of knowing and the domination of 
western ways of understanding. This assumed universalism gives these same 
organisations the power to dictate what constitutes good ethical practice, and require 
that researchers seek their participants’ informed consent to data sharing (a practice 
that, as I highlighted above, can be seen as highly unethical). This assumed 
universalism is also what gives government bodies (funding and law-enforcing 
agencies) the power to disinvest researchers of their moral ownership and intellectual 
property rights over their data. It renders legitimate the Freedom of Information 
legislation, the legal right for interested third parties to request access to research data, 
and the legal obligation for researchers (via the institutions that employ them) to 
release their data (and, as some see it, to violate their intellectual property rights). 
This assumed universalism also places researchers under moral obligation to release 
their data: to privilege an abstract and universal ‘greater good’ over the specific 
interests of their respondents or co-researchers, a practice that some regard as a 
violation of the trust-based relationships that researchers develop with their 
participants (eg Kaye et al. 2009; Mauthner 2012). The assumed universalism of 
treating data as a common resource not only makes these practices ontologically 
possible (it literally brings them into being and allows them to materialise), it also 
gives them moral and political legitimacy. It gives the agencies promoting these 
practices the moral and political means with which to claim that these practices are ‘in 
the public interest’.  
 
Concluding comments 
In the 15 or so years since I was first drawn into thinking about the notion of research 
data as a shared or common resource (see also Mauthner et al. 1998; Parry and 
Mauthner 2004, 2005; Mauthner and Parry 2009), I have seen the widespread 
promotion and institutionalisation of what remain largely unquestioned and 
unexamined assumptions: that research data are, by default, a common resource; that 
data belong, by default, to the public; that researchers have, by default, a moral duty 
and responsibility to the public to share their data; that data sharing is, by default, a 
scientifically, morally and politically progressive practice; and that sharing data 
provides, by default, a good return on economic investments. As these beliefs are 
increasingly being imposed through regulatory practices, researchers across 
disciplines are questioning these assumptions, and voicing growing ethical, moral, 
scientific and political concerns. They are asking questions such as: Are the 
recommended ethical practices for data sharing really ethical? Is data sharing in the 
public interest if we risk losing the public’s trust in science? Does data sharing 
necessarily constitute good science? Does data sharing necessarily democratise 
science and redistribute resources (and power) amongst scientists? (see Mauthner and 
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Parry in press). And to what extent are notions of ‘globalisation’ and ‘the public 
good’ being appropriated by powerful research and policy bodies to promote 
economically-driven practices that may violate the rights and interests of members of 
the public and of research communities? Within a representational framework, these 
critical voices are easily dismissed (see Mauthner 2012; Kaye et al. 2009). This is 
because what gives rise to, and confers legitimacy upon, their concerns is precisely 
what is being rendered invisible within a representational framework: the material-
discursive practices and labour of data production. Shifting the metaphysical 
framework is therefore important because it makes it possible to hear the legitimacy 
of these concerns and take them seriously. This is where Barad’s work proves so 
useful. It enables us to make this shift and helps us excavate and question the specific 
metaphysical, moral, economic and political commitments that underpin the assumed 
universalism of treating data, a priori, as a common resource. This highlights how this 
is far from being an innocent practice. Rather, it reconfigures the politics of 
knowledge production, shifts power away from data producers into the hands of data 
funders/users/consumers, and in the process changes what we discover and how we 
discover it. This points to the need not only to debate, rather than assume, the notion 
of treating data as a common resource; but also to understand what moral, ethical, 
political, legal, economic and social realities such a position performs into and out of 
being. In particular, we need to better understand how to conceptualise research data 
as a ‘common’ resource and further explore the range of potential institutional, 
regulatory and governance arrangements for managing research data as a common 
resource. Here we may usefully draw on long-standing and interdisciplinary debates 
about the ‘commons’, as well as more recent explorations of the specific challenges 
thrown up by the ‘digital commons’ and ‘global commons’ (such as the knowledge, 
information, the internet, software) (e.g. Hess and Ostrom 2006).  
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